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The lack of knowledge—as Timothy Williamson (2000) famously maintains—is ignorance.1 Rad-
ical sceptical arguments, at least in the tradition of Descartes, threaten universal ignorance. They
do so by attempting to establish that we lack any knowledge, even if we can retain other kinds of
epistemic standings, like epistemically justified belief. If understanding is a species of knowledge,
then radical sceptical arguments threaten to rob us categorically of knowledge and understanding
in one fell swoop by implying universal ignorance. If, however, understanding is not a species of
knowledge, then three questions arise: (i) is ignorance the lack of understanding, even if under-
standing is not a species of knowledge? (ii) If not, what kind of state of intellectual impoverish-
ment best describes a lack of understanding? (iii) What would a radical sceptical argument look
like that threatened that kind of intellectual impoverishment, even if not threatening ignorance?
This paper answers each of these questions in turn. I conclude by showing how the answers de-
veloped to (i-iii) interface in an interesting way with Virtue Perspectivism as an anti-sceptical
strategy.
1. ignorance and understanding
Does ‘ignorance’ best characterise a lack of understanding (as it characterises a lack of
knowledge), even if understanding is not a species of knowledge? One might initially
think so. Assume—as has been argued variously by Jonathan Kvanvig (2003), Alison
Hills (2009), Duncan Pritchard (2009), and others—that the satisfaction conditions
for understanding something, X, aren’t met simply by knowing propositions about X.
Even on this assumption, wemight nonetheless think that a lack of understanding
implies ignorance. Just consider the student who fails to understand basic algebra.
1The knowledge/ignorance contrast, while crucial to Williamson’s project in Knowledge and its Lim-




Isn’t this student in a state of ignorance, and isn’t this ignorance implied by his lack of
understanding, regardless of whether it would be implied by what he fails to know?
On this way of thinking, Williamson’s dictum that the lack of knowledge is igno-
rance would need an important qualification2: ignorance would be best understood
as a wider kind of intellectual impoverishment than merely a lack of knowledge, one
that is implied disjunctively: (i) in all those cases where knowledge is lacked (consis-
tent with Williamson’s claim that the lack of knowledge is ignorance) and (ii) in all
(or at least some) cases where something else (whatever understanding requires that is
not secured by knowing—call this, ‘α’) is lacked.
Such a suggestion runs in to immediate problems, however. Let Σ be a set of
propositions that constitute a subject matter. A subject’s S’s lacking ‘α’, with respect to
Σ, is compatible both with (i) S’s knowing some, or all, of the propositions p1, p1 …pn
in Σ; as well as with (ii) S’s not knowing all or even some of these propositions. If the
disjunctive view is to be read as maintaining that lacking ‘α’ implies ignorance only in
those cases where one lacks knowledge of the (relevant) propositions p1, p1 … pn in
Σ, then the disjunctive account simply collapses into Williamson’s simple dictum; for
in this case it would be a lack of knowledge, rather than a lack of ‘α’, that is ultimately
responsible for the ignorance in question. But, if we are to read the disjunctive account
as maintaining that lacking ‘α’ implies ignorance in some cases where the relevant
knowledge (constituting the subject matter) is present, then we lose our grip on any
important contrast between knowledge and ignorance, by attributing ignorance even
when one is maximally knowledgeable.
One might balk at this dilemma and suggest that we should differentiate between
two species of ignorance: propositional ignorance and objectual ignorance. A subject
S is propositionally ignorant, with respect to a proposition, p, if and only if S fails to
know that p. A subject is objectually ignorant, with respect to a subject matter, X, if
and only if it’s not the case that S understands X.
Williamson’s view that the lack of knowledge is ignorance might then be repo-
sitioned as the claim that the lack of knowledge is (merely) propositional ignorance
but not objectual ignorance; this repositioning of Williamson’s dictum is compatible
with maintaining furthermore that objectual ignorance, but not propositional igno-
rance, is implied by a lack of understanding. In this respect, the view that the lack
of understanding is (a species of) ignorance could be maintained, even if a lack of
understanding isn’t said to imply propositional ignorance.
2Acomparativelymore radical departure from the standard view of ignorance as a lack of knowledge
has been proposed in a series of papers by Rik Peels (2010, 2011), according to whom ignorance should
be identified more narrowly with a lack of true belief than with a lack of knowledge. For a defence of the
standard view of ignorance against Peels’ criticisms, see Le Morvan (2012).
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Such a move, however, generates a problematic result to do with how ignorance is
overcome. Consider the following ‘antidote’ thesis:
Antidote: Knowledge is the antidote to ignorance in the following sense:
necessarily, if a state of intellectual impoverishment, I, is an ignorance
state, then, I can be overcome through the acquisition of knowledge.
In slogan form, Antidote says that always and everywhere knowledge can over-
come ignorance.3 The view just canvassed, however, must allow for the possibility
of some ignorance states such that, for a thinker who is in them, there is no possible
knowledge such that, even if the thinker had that knowledge, the thinker’s having that
knowledge would overcome that ignorance. But this is a strange result; it seems very
much like countenancing the possibility of some disease states such that, for a patient
who is in them, there is no cure such that, even if the diseased patient had that cure for
that disease, the cure would overcome that disease.
Granted, something other than knowledge might be needed to overcome certain
forms of ignorance. Sometimes we use the term ‘ignorant’ pejoratively to refer to indi-
viduals with defective capacities or defective habits as opposed to defective states, per
se. Defective capacities and habits might require training in addition to knowledge to
overcome them. For ignorance states, though, it’s hard to see how it’s not the case that
knowledge is enough.
The discussion to this point suggests that to the extent that someone who doesn’t
understand (e.g.,) algebra is in an ignorance state, what explains this ignorance state is
most plausibly a lack of knowledge. If understanding is a species of knowledge, then a
lack of understanding is always ignorance. If understanding is not a species of knowl-
edge, however, then when one lacks understanding, one’s intellectual impoverishment
will not always be a matter of ignorance, even if it sometimes so happens to involve
it. For in cases in which one fails to understand even when they maximally know,
there’s simply nothing they’re ignorant of. Lewis Carroll’s (1895) notorious pupil is
intellectually impoverished in a serious way, but he’s not ignorant.
A consequence of these conclusions is that if understanding is not a species of
knowledge, then the following analogy is an entirely open one, and one that needs
filling:
Knowledge is to ignorance as understanding is to _______?
3That is, for any given ignorance state, I, of a subject, S, there is a set of propopoitions, Σ, such that
I would be overcome if S were to know all the propositions, p1, p1 … pn, of Σ.
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2. ignorance and confusion
How do we go about filling in the blank? It will be helpful at this point to think about
what we can say positively about ignorance. It is the lack of knowledge, sure, but it is
not everything that is the lack of knowledge. (A house lacks knowledge, absent any
thinkers, but the house is not ignorant. Nor are the dead.)
“The lack of knowledge is ignorance” should be read with a domain restriction:
the lack of knowledge, by those capable of knowledge, is ignorance. Who is capable of
knowledge? Answering this allows us to make this domain restriction more precise.
Minimally, one is capable of knowledge if one is capable of belief.4 And so the core
idea can be put more informatively: the lack of knowledge, for those capable of at least
belief, is ignorance.
For Williamson, mere belief (alternatively: ‘botched knowing’) is what is residual
when there is a maladaption of mind to world.5 Mere belief is one (but not the only)
species of ignorance, one that essentially involves a failed attempt at knowledge. Not
all ignorance states, however, implicate knowledge attempts. A believer might be ig-
norant that p because she has never considered p before, and so fails to know p. Even
so, we restrict the domain of “the lack of knowledge is ignorance” with reference to
those cases where what we regard as actual attempts at knowledge are at least possible.
Is one capable of understanding if one is capable of belief? If understanding is a
species of knowledge, then yes; and this is exactly what we should expect given that,
if understanding is a species of knowledge, a lack of understanding is ignorance. But
if understanding is not a species of knowledge, one might be capable of belief even if
not capable of understanding. For if understanding is not a species of knowledge, and
understanding requires a thinker’s being in an ‘α’ relation to a subject matter where
being in that relation isn’t secured by knowing facts, then there might be a demon in
epistemic hell who preys on the ‘α’ condition, leaving knowledge intact. Whenever
one is about to make the kind of cognitive attempt that when successful results in the
satisfying of ‘α’, the demon always preempts this attempt bymanipulating the subject’s
brain. A thinker who is imperilled by that demon is capable of belief (and so capable
of both knowledge and ignorance) but is not capable of understanding.
What this suggests is that one is capable of understanding not if one is capable of
belief, but if one is capable of making an α-attempt (or perhaps, if one is capable of
belief and capable of making an α-attempt.)
4This claim, to be clear, does not involve any commitement to the idea that capability of belief ensures
any knowledge. Rather, being capable of belief ensures one just of being in the market for knowledge.
One can be in the market for knowledge and (due to being in a bad enviroment) not actually attain it.
Even in such a situation, though, one’s belief capacities make one knowledge capable.
5Williamson (2000, 1).
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In the contemporary epistemology of objectual understanding, the very idea of
making an α-attempt is often captured in terms of grasping.6 For example, according
to Kvanvig (2003), one understands something, X, only when one grasps, of the body
of propositions (at least some of which must be true) comprising X, their explanatory
and coherence-making relations.7 The term ‘grasping’ is dangerously ambiguous be-
tween a success reading and a performative reading. On the performative reading,
grasping is an attempt at understanding, one that is neutral between success and go-
ing awry (e.g., suppose one is in command of a range of X-relevant explanatory and
coherence-making relations, but of the wrong explanatory and coherence-making re-
lations, leading one to be disposed to make the wrong kinds of inferences, predic-
tions, etc.). On a performative reading, understanding implies not just grasping but
successful grasping. On a success reading, grasping is implicitly successful in the way
understanding demands.
We are in a position to say something now about how to fill in our blank: knowl-
edge is to ignorance as understanding is to ______. The lack of knowledge, for those
capable of belief, is ignorance, where belief is a knowledge attempt8, and where mere
belief is both (i) a botched instance of what it is attempting (knowledge) as well as a
species of ignorance. By parity of reasoning, a species of what fills in our blank will
be something that’s both an attempt at understanding, and such that a mere instance
of it is both (i) a botched instance of what it is attempting (understanding) as well
as a species of what it is the understanding-capable individual lacks when she lacks
understanding.
Mere (performative) grasping fits this description. Knowledge is to belief as un-
derstanding is to mere performative grasping (hereafter, p-grasping). Mere belief is a
species of ignorance, the lack of knowledge, and mere p-grasping is a species of what
which is the lack of understanding?
I submit that the best candidate here is confusion—and thus, that knowledge is to
ignorance as understanding is to confusion; a lack of knowledge, for those capable of
belief, is ignorance, and a lack of understanding, for those capable of p-grasping (as
opposed to: those capable of belief), is confusion.9
6For an overview, see Gordon (2017).
7For an knowledge-based account of objectual understanding, where basing relations between
known propositions render the need for a separate grasping condition otiose, see Kelp (2015).
8Note that one needn’t be a ‘knowledge-firster’ to accept the position that belief is a kind of botched
knowing; the use of this idea accordingly doesn’t involve any antecedent commitment to regarding
knowledge as a theoretical primitive.
9Theanalogy requires one caveat. Whereas onewho has nevermade an attempt at believing a propo-
sition, p, can nonetheless be ignorant with respect to p—our 16th century ancestors ignorant with respect
to propositions only recently learned about quantum mechanics, and which they’d never considered—it
seems less felicitous to say that those who have never made an attempt to p-grasp some phenomenon are
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Confusion is more complicated than ignorance. There are three fundamentally
different ways in which p-grasping might miss the mark of understanding. First, one
might have bad inputs; in such a case, even a competent grasp of the coherence and
explanatory relations between these bad inputs falls short of understanding. Second,
one might have good inputs, but grasp the wrong kind coherence and explanatory
relations (competently or otherwise) between these good inputs. Third, one might
have good inputs, and grasp the right coherence and explanatory relations between
these good inputs, but do so incompetently. Call the first sort of confusion wayward
confusion, the second misguided confusion, and the third misapprehended confusion.
3. radical scepticism and confusion
What would a radical sceptical argument look like that targeted understanding by
threatening confusion, even if not by threatening ignorance? We can envision (at least)
three varieties of such an argument, varieties which threaten wayward, misguided and
misapprehended confusion respectively.
Our first step to this end to will be to articulate a general kind of understanding-
based sceptical scenario I’ll call a confusion hypothesis. Descartes’ demon is a deceiving
demon, one that threatened ignorance via threatening deception. The demon that will
be relevant to our purposes will be not a deceiving demon, but an obfuscating demon,
one who threatens confusion by threatening (various kinds of) defective p-grasping.
Ours will not be the first non-deceiving demon that’s been of interest to episte-
mologists. Here it will be instructive to briefly consider Jonathan Schaffer’s (2010)
description of his ‘debasing demon’:
More precisely, the debasing demon can be conjured by acceptance of the
following three plausible claims: (1) Knowledge requires the production
of belief, properly based on the evidence (2) Any belief can be produced
on an improper basis (3) It is always possible, when a belief is produced
on an improper basis, for it to seem later as if one had produced a be-
lief properly based on the evidence.… Given (l)-(3), the following sort of
doubt may arise. For any given belief, the debasing demon may ensure
confused about that phenomenon, even if they are capable of making such an attempt. I’d like to submit
two lines of response on this point. Firstly, it’s plausible that being confused about a phenomenon is, in
some cases, compatible with having never made an attempt to p-grasp that phenomenon. Early Homo
Sapiens were plausibly confused with respect to the phenomenon of lightning and fire despite (initially
at least) having yet to make a genuine attempt to understand it. Secondly, those unconvinced that there
are any such cases are welcome to read the operative claim as qualified in the following way: a lack of
understanding, for those capable of, and have made some attempt at, p-grasping, is confusion. Thanks
to Christoph Kelp for discussion on this point.
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that it was produced on an improper basis (by (2)). She may then make
it later seem to the believer as if he had produced the belief properly (by
(3)). And the result is that the believer becomes debased, in that his belief
fails to satisfy the basing requirement for knowledge (as per (1)). So now
I might wonder, do I actually know that I have hands, or was I merely
guessing? (2010, 232).
Note that Schaffer’s demon is one that imperils us intellectually not by preying on
the world (as did Descartes’ deceiving demon, leaving our minds intact while discon-
necting the world from our representations of it) but on our cognising itself, viz., by
debasing our beliefs in ways undetectable.10
We are in a position now to conjure the obfuscating demon in a structurally anal-
ogous way. By parity of reasoning:
4. Understanding a subject matter requires successfully grasping the coherence
and explanatory relations between the propositions that make up that subject
matter, where this requires (i) good inputs; (ii) grasping the right coherence and
explanatory relations between these good inputs; and (iii) competently grasping
the right coherence and explanatory relations between these good inputs.
5. Any episode of p-grasping can fail any of the requirements (i-iii).
6. It is always possible, when p-grasping fails any of the requirements (i-iii), for it
to seem later as if one’s p-grasping satisfied that requirement.
We may then argue analogously via Schaffer’s template strategy as follows: Given
(4-6), the following sort of doubt may arise. For any episode of p-grasping, the ob-
fuscating demon may ensure that it failed any of the requirements (i-iii) (by (5)). She
may then make it later seem to the thinker as if her p-grasping satisfied (i-iii)). And
the result is that the thinker becomes confused, in that her grasping fails to satisfy re-
quirements that are necessary for understanding (as per (4)). So now I might wonder,
do I actually understand organic chemistry, or am I merely confused?11
The most virulent confusion hypothesis is one on which the obfuscating demon
preys on all three of (i-iii), causing a thinker to become confused thrice over: the
thinker suffers all at once from wayward confusion, misguided confusion, and mis-
apprehended confusion. In this woeful scenario, one p-grasps (i) bad inputs and (ii)
grasps the wrong coherence and explanatory relations between these bad inputs (e.g.,
10For a criticism of Schaffer’s treatment of the basing relation in this sceptical argument, see Bondy
and Carter (2018).
11This is of course an embellishment of Schaffer’s (2010, 232) own reasoning, applied to the present
case.
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relations other than those that actually hold between these bad inputs); and (iii) does
so incompetently.
What is required to rationally dismiss that one is imperilled in any, or all, of these
ways? What, exactly, is the intellectual gain one makes by doing so?
4. perspectival virtue epistemology
At this point, it will be helpful to register carefully a point of connection between two
epistemic plights. Firstly, the plight of an ordinary thinker who is very confident she
understands basic organic chemistry. She thinks she grasps perfectly well how the rel-
evant connections hang together. But she doubts whether she can rule out definitively
that she is the victim of any (or all) of the obfuscating demon’s confusion scenarios.
And this is because doing so would require some kind of assurance that her cognition
is not being distorted even when she seems to grasp matters obvious to her.
Now compare this thinker’s situation with the plight of Descartes’ atheist math-
ematician, who can clearly ascertain certain axioms of basic geometry, but who—as
Descartes tells us—can’t rule out definitively that he is deceived even on what seems
most evident. Here is Descartes (1641/1984) in the Second Set of Replies to the Med-
itations:
The fact that an atheist can be “clearly aware that the three angles of a tri-
angle are equal to two right angles” is something I do not dispute. But I
maintain that this awareness of his [cognitionem] is not true knowledge
[scientia]. . . . Now since we are supposing that this individual is an athe-
ist, he cannot be certain that he is not being deceived on matters which
seem to him to be very evident (as I fully explained). And although this
doubt may not occur to him, it can still crop up if someone else raises the
point or if he looks into the matter himself. So he will never be free of
this doubt until he acknowledges that God exists (1641/1984, 101).12
On Descartes’ epistemology, what the atheist mathematician possesses in this cir-
cumstance is cognitio, what he attains via the deployment of his reliable faculty of ra-
tional intuition. But from Descartes’ perspective, this thinker still falls short of ‘true
knowledge’ or scientia, which requires an infallible assessment that what is evident to
him through the exercise of rational intuition cannot be mistaken.
Here are Ernest Sosa’s (2009) reflections on this situation:
Since Descartes wants not just reliable, truth-conducive cognitio, since he
wants the enlightened attainment of reflective scientia, he needs a defense
12This passage is quoted also in Sosa (2009, 140).
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against skeptical doubts that target his intellectual faculties, not only his
faculties of perception, memory, and introspection, but even his faculty
of intuitive reason, by which he might know that 3 + 2 = 5, that if he
thinks then he exists, and the like (Sosa 2009, 141).
Of course, the need for such a defence—one that would afford him additional
intellectual security not gained by cognitio alone—led Descartes down a dubious path
(replete with a proof of a non-deceiving God) generally dismissed as an intractably
flawed ‘Cartesian Circle’.
However, according to Sosa, there is something fundamentally right about the
structure of Descates’ project; the problem with it is principally its rationalist content,
one firmly committed to both internalist rationalism and infallibilism.
Here is what Sosa thinks Descartes gets right. Descartes is right to think that
there is a certain kind of valuable epistemic standing (cognitio, for Descartes, animal
knowledge, for Sosa) that is secured simply by deploying faculties with a certain kind
of epistemic pedigree (for Descartes, infallible rational intuition, for Sosa, fallible but
reliable competences like perception, memory, etc.), and where this positive epistemic
standing does not require any antecedent appreciation of those very faculties as having
that positive epistemic pedigree. And furthermore, Sosa thinks that Descartes is right
that we can then use such faculties to gain a second-order perspective, one through
which we may appreciate those faculties as having that status, and in doing so place
that first-order status in a competent second-order perspective, raising cognitio to the
level of scientae for Descartes, and animal knowledge to the level of reflective knowledge
for Sosa.13
And so Sosa’s Virtue Perspectivism, like Descartes’ epistemology—itself a kind
of Rationalist Perspectivism—adverts to a two-tiered, perspectival structure, where
the ascent from lower to higher knowledge marks an intellectually valuable transition
attained through competent (i.e., reliably sourced) reflection on one’s epistemic posi-
tion.14 But—and here’s the crucial difference—whereas Rationalist Perspectivism is
both internalist and infallibilist in character, Sosa’s Virtue Perspectivism is both fal-
libilist and externalist. For Sosa, the intellectual value of what a thinker can attain
via trusting the deliverances of reliable albeit fallible competences at the first order
can be improved upon substantially without certainty or infallibility ever entering the
13According to Sosa ‘[…] animal knowledge does not require that the knower have an epistemic
perspective on his belief, a perspective from which he endorses the source of that belief, from which he
can see that source as reliably truth-conducive. Reflective knowledge does by contrast require such a
perspective’ (2009, 135).
14As Sosa himself puts it, ‘In structure virtue perspectivism is thus Cartesian, though in content it
is not’ (2009, 194). For more detailed discussion of the connections between Rationalist Perspectivism
and Virtue Perspectivism, see along with Sosa (2009), Reed (2012) and Carter (Forthcoming).
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picture. What’s needed is just that the reliability of one’s first-order competences the
exercise of which yield first-order animal knowledge are placed in a competent (viz.,
reliable), even if fallible, second-order perspective. This is what’s needed to know that
one’s intellectual faculties are reliable.
The comparison between Rationalist Perspectivism and Virtue Perspectivism of-
fers a unique vantage point fromwhich to return to the respective situations ofDescartes’
atheist mathematician and our own thinker who, despite impeccably grasping organic
chemistry, is faced with the niggling worry that her grasping might be imperilled via
any one of the three confusion hypotheses canvassed.
I think both Descartes and Sosa will agree that our thinker’s position can be im-
proved upon, and I think they are right. And that this is so even if we make explicit
that the subject’s p-grasping of the subject matter that is organic chemistry satisfies
(i-iii) in condition (4) above. Improving upon this position on the Rationalist Per-
spectivist programme would require infallible certainty (let’s set aside how this would
be acquired, e.g., via proof of a non-deceiving God or otherwise) that one’s grasping-
relevant competences can’t possibly lead to (any of the three) forms of confusion the
obfuscating demon might bring about. If we take this requirement as a valid one, it
is not evident that it will in fact be met (any more than that any thinker can in prac-
tice achieve scientia by Descartes’ own demanding lights, as in the case of the atheist
mathematician.15)
By contrast, Virtue Perspectivism offers an attaintable way to improve both the
atheist mathematician’s knowledge and our own thinker’s understanding, and more-
over, to defend these respectively in the face of sceptical doubts. In the former case,
what’s needed is (in short) not certainty or God, but just more animal knowledge di-
rected to the subject’s own epistemic position—viz., knowledge the mathematician
can gain through the deliverances of her reliable rational faculties. This accumulated
body of animal knowledge then furnishes the mathematician (no less than any ordi-
nary perceiver) with a reliable kind of ‘broad coherence16’ with reference to which she
can then reliably and competently17 come to know her that faculties are reliable.
15For an excellent discussion of whether such certainty is needed for the kind of intellectual stability
it is appropriate to aspire to, see Reed (2012). As Reed sees it, the kind of stability Descartes sought
might well be unattainable, but nonetheless, Sosa is mistaken in thinking that merely by assimilating his
own externalist, fallibilist virtue epistemology within the kind of perspectival structure characteristic of
Rationalist Perspectivism, that Sosa’s reflective knower attains that same level of stability, one that would
be capable of quelling doubt.
16See Sosa (1997) for an extended discussion of the role of broad coherence within the virtue per-
spectivist’s picture.
17In Sosa’s more recent work, e.g., Sosa (2015), he has gone further to articulate the structure of
second-order competence within his bi-level virtue epistemology, which he calls alternatively ‘reflective
competence’ and ‘metacompetence’. Important to his view is that thesemeta-competences have the same
structure as first-order competences. They are reliable dispositions with an ‘SSS’ structure. See, for
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A development of the above story is the central task of Sosa’s Reflective Knowledge
(2009), and it’s beyond the scope of what I can do here to attempt a full defence—or
for that matter, even a full presentation—of the view. I want to instead envision a new
application of the model. For when one’s understanding is threatened in the face of
radical confusion hypotheses of the sort canvassed, there is a principled and viable
move from within the Virtue Perspectivist’s general framework to make in response.
In outline, the Virtue Perspectivist story I’m envisioning will go as follows: what
our chemist needs to bolster her understanding of organic chemistry in the face of
sceptical challenge (viz., a confusion hypothesis) is not certainty or God, but just more
understanding directed to her own epistemic position—viz., understanding of the sort
that our organic chemist can gain through the deliverances of the very kinds of reliable
faculties that we’ve already stipulated characterise her reliable (along all three dimen-
sions, (i-iii)) p-grasping. This accumulated body of understanding can then furnish
our chemist (no less than, by analogy, the ordinary perceiver, or the atheist mathe-
matician) with a reliable kind of broad coherence with reference to which she can then
reliably and competently grasp not only organic chemistry (as she did before), but now
also her own grasp of it. The result is, accordingly, a form of reflective understanding
that goes beyond the understanding she possessed before. This is the story available
from within a Virtue Perspectivist framework.
5. further discussion
How, then, should we judge this story as faring against the obfuscating demon? There
are broadly two kinds of line we might take here, one that is pessimistic and another
that is optimistic. Fortunately, in this case, the optimistic perspective is also the real-
istic one.
On the pessimistic side—one I don’t subscribe to—consider things from the point
of view of a longtime critic of Virtue Perspectivism as an anti-sceptical strategy: Barry
Stroud.18 As Stroud sees it, fallible second-order assurance is no assurance at all19; fal-
lible second-order assurance is based in sources that would be just as they are when
one is in a bad case.20 As such, fallible second-order assurance is perfectly compat-
ible with the persistence of doubt—a point that has been highlighted more recently
by Baron Reed (2012). Transposed to our own case specifically: the kind of second-
order assurance one acquires by reliably grasping one’s own grasp of a subject matter
is such that the basis of this assurance would be the same that one would have even
example, Sosa (2010).
18See, for example, Stroud (2004, 1989).
19For a forceful expression of this line, see Stroud (2004, 171–2).
20For a detailed defence of this way of thinking about fallibilism, see Reed (2002).
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if one were, say, the unwitting victim of one of our three confusion hypotheses. Ac-
cording to the pessimistic line, then, the very persistence of such doubt and the kind
of cognitive vulnerability that it implies mean that the sceptical threat to our chemist’s
understanding raised by the obfuscating demon is not such that ascending from reg-
ular understanding to reflective understanding does much to disarm it.21
This envisioned pessimistic line, however, misses the mark. To appreciate why,
remember that our chemist already understands organic chemistry, ex hypothesi, in
virtue of p-grasping along all three success dimensions. This was never in dispute.
What she was said to need was a defence against sceptical doubts that target her intel-
lectual faculties (those which source her p-grasping) by calling them into question.
Virtue Perspectivism, it should be emphasised, offers exactly such a defence, even
if it is not of the sort that would be sought by an epistemic internalist like Stroud.
After all, what the Virtue Perspectivist’s framework can explain is how—by ascend-
ing from understanding to reflective understanding—a thinker can gain a grasp of the
grasp she has of what she understands, and thus, to appreciate her own grasp of or-
ganic chemistry as reliable. Crucially, as long as our chemist is in fact reliable at the
second-order (whether she’s aware of this reliability or not), then she’s now got just
what we initially said she needed: a defence against sceptical doubts targeting her p-
grasping, p-grasping she now reliably grasps as reliable. Granted, reaching a position
from which she can defend against sceptical doubts is not such that the attaining of
that position thereby immunises her from the possibility of doubting herself. But to
think that defending against sceptical doubts requires that it be impossible that one
doubt herself22 is a confusion in itself.23
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